The invisible hand in negotiation : are individualistic orientations collectively valuable? by Schei, Vidar et al.
Negotiating Groups 1
 
Running head: NEGOTIATING GROUPS 
 
 
 
 
THE INVISIBLE HAND IN NEGOTIATION: 
ARE INDIVIDUALISTIC ORIENTATIONS  
COLLECTIVELY VALUABLE? 
 
 
 
 
Vidar Schei  
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration  
Department of Strategy and Management 
Breiviksveien 40, N-5045 Bergen,  
Norway 
Phone: + 47 55 95 98 71 
Fax: + 47 55 95 94 30 
Email: vidar.schei@nhh.no 
  
 
Jørn K. Rognes 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 
Department of Strategy and Management 
Breiviksveien 40, N-5045 Bergen,  
Norway 
Phone: + 47 55 95 94 95 
Fax: + 47 55 95 94 30 
Email: jorn.rognes@nhh.no 
 
 
Carsten K. W. De Dreu 
University of Amsterdam 
Department of Psychology 
Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam,  
The Netherlands 
Phone: +31 20 525 6865 
Fax: +31 20 639 0531 
Email: c.k.w.dedreu@uva.nl 
 
 
 
 
 
November 28, 2006 
Negotiating Groups 2
THE INVISIBLE HAND IN NEGOTIATION: 
ARE INDIVIDUALISTIC ORIENTATIONS COLLECTIVELY VALUABLE? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines how group members’ individualistic or cooperative 
motivational orientations impact the process and outcomes in negotiating groups. A total 
of 228 students participated in a three-person negotiation simulation where orientation 
was induced through written instructions and members were aware of each other’s 
orientations. Results showed that groups with only cooperative members were more 
satisfied with the negotiation than members of the other group compositions. 
Conversely, groups with only individualistic members reached higher joint outcome than 
groups with only cooperative members and groups with a mix in orientations. Process-
analyses indicated that the individualistic groups increased their integrative activities and 
decreased their distributive activities towards the end of the negotiation. The results 
challenge the dominating view that individualistic orientations are detrimental for 
constructive group-process and high joint outcome. 
 
Negotiating Groups 3
Groups frequently have to negotiate their decisions because members have 
conflictive interests and opinions. According to the negotiation literature (e.g., De Dreu, 
Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), the agreements that best reconcile the parties’ interests and 
provide high joint benefit are reached when negotiators share a cooperative motivational 
orientation (i.e., they want to maximize both their individual outcome and the joint 
outcome of the group). This knowledge is, however, largely derived from research on 
dyadic negotiations, and although negotiations in dyads and groups share many 
characteristics, they also differ in important ways (Bazerman, Mannix, & Thompson, 
1988). For example, when moving from only two, to three or more negotiators, 
challenges attached to complexity in information, relations, procedures and strategies, 
increase (Kramer, 1991). 
Unfortunately, research on motivational orientation in negotiating groups is 
limited. More important, the few studies done largely ignore that members of the same 
group often have different motivational orientations, i.e., that some group members may 
be individualistic and some may be cooperative. Such mix in orientations is quite likely 
as groups become increasingly heterogeneous (Brett, 2001). Furthermore, previous 
research has not acknowledged that in many groups negotiating members have 
information about each other’s motivational orientations. Members of management 
teams or cross-functional teams inside organizations, and members of business teams 
between organizations (e.g., joint ventures) will, for example, typically have information 
about each others’ orientations from previous encounters. 
Consequently, the purpose of the present study is to examine how group 
members’ cooperative and individualistic orientations affect the process and the outcome 
of the negotiation when members are aware of each other’s orientations. We choose to 
focus on an individualistic and a cooperative motivational orientation because they seem 
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to be the most common orientations in negotiations (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), and are 
found to have substantial impact in dyadic negotiations (De Dreu et al., 2000). 
Furthermore, we choose to focus on motivational orientation stemming from situational 
characteristics (state) rather than orientations stemming from individual dispositions 
(trait), because situational characteristics are easier to affect from a managerial point of 
view, and more strongly relate to organizational reality (e.g., climate factors, incentive 
systems). Below, we develop alternative hypotheses about the relationship between 
group members’ motivational orientation and the negotiation-process and outcome – 
including both objective (joint outcome) and subjective (satisfaction) outcome-measures. 
We included both objective and subjective outcome-measures to support research 
indicating that negotiators not only consider their material gains and losses (Curhan, 
Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006), and because oftentimes a disconnect is seen between the quality 
of negotiated agreement, and the outcome-satisfaction parties derive from that agreement 
(Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002). 
Hypotheses Development 
The effects of motivational orientation on negotiation process and outcomes can 
be predicted by the Dual Concern Theory. The Dual Concern Theory suggest that a 
negotiator’s behavior is determined by two motives; the negotiator’ concern for own 
outcome and the negotiator’s concern for the others’ outcome. High concern on both 
dimensions (i.e., similar to a “cooperative” orientation) predicts problem-solving 
behavior, while high self-concern and low other-concern (i.e., similar to an 
“individualistic” orientation) predicts contending behavior. Studies related to the Dual 
Concern Theory have usually supported the model’s predictions. In a meta-analytic 
review, De Dreu et al. (2000) found that cooperative dyads in general reached higher 
joint outcome than individualistic dyads. The cooperative dyads reached their higher 
Negotiating Groups 5
joint outcome by having more integrative processes (i.e., group members communicating 
their interests, listening to each others, and trusting the information exchange), and less 
distributive processes (i.e., group members focusing on conflictive issues, being 
argumentative, and demanding concessions) than the individualistic dyads.  
The review by De Dreu et al. (2000) almost exclusively focused on interpersonal 
negotiation, and did not include larger-sized interactions. However, moving to 
negotiating groups (three or more parties) create extra challenges. For example, in 
dyadic negotiations, a person can focus on the behavior of the other party, and 
concentrate energy on influencing the target person. In groups, it is also necessary to 
consider the effects of one’s own behavior on group members other than the target 
person (Kramer, 1991), and also often relate to different strategies from different group 
members (Brett, 1991). Furthermore, in groups there is a potential for coalition 
formation not found in dyads (Mannix, 1994; Ten Velden, Beersma, & De Dreu, in 
press).  
Although these differences may suggest that findings from dyadic research do not 
comfortably generalize to group interaction and negotiation, several studies of group 
negotiations indicate that having cooperative rather than individualistic group members 
facilitate integrative processes, impede distributive processes, and enhance group climate 
and joint outcome (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002; Beersma & De Dreu, 2005; Weingart, 
Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Furthermore, Weingart, Brett, and Olekalns (2002) found that 
the more cooperative compared to individualistic members a group had, the more 
integrative the negotiation process was (no effects on joint outcome were observed).  
 In the context of the present study; where group members are familiar with each 
others’ motivational orientation, one may expect similar results. In the cooperative 
groups, for instance, knowing that one’s co-members share one’s cooperative orientation 
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makes it easier to reveal one’s true preferences and opinions, and easier to trust the 
information given by the other members. Higher information exchange combined with 
high levels of trust are known to lead to more integrative agreements, yielding high joint 
gain and high satisfaction. Conversely, in groups having individualistic members, 
knowing that there are members that only care for their own individual outcome may 
result in power-games where members demand concessions from each others – thereby 
stimulating distributive processes resulting in dissatisfied members and low joint 
outcomes. Hence, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 1: Joint outcome will be higher the more cooperative members there 
are in the group.  
Hypothesis 2: Group members’ satisfaction will be higher the more cooperative 
members there are in the group. 
Hypothesis 3: The negotiation process will be more integrative and less 
distributive the more cooperative members there are in the group. 
Whereas the above follows from previous work in a rather straightforward 
manner, a careful analysis may lead to a set of competing hypotheses. For example, 
Weingart et al. (1993) found cooperative groups to do better than individualistic groups 
only when the groups were instructed to consider issues sequentially. When groups 
considered issues simultaneously (as they are allowed in our study), individualistic 
groups did as well as cooperative groups. Similarly, Beersma and De Dreu (2002) found 
cooperative groups to outperform individualistic groups only when the structure of the 
negotiation was asymmetrical (i.e., two parties had compatible preferences while the 
remaining party had opposite preferences). When the structure was symmetrical (as it is 
in our study) cooperative groups did not get significantly higher outcome than 
individualistic groups. Moreover, some studies comparing cooperative and 
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individualistic groups report on no differences in group outcome (Schei & Rognes, 2005; 
Weingart et al., 2002), and there is also some indication that an individualistic 
orientation can enhance group outcome. For instance, Shapiro and Rognes (1996) 
measured team-members conflict orientation and found that a strong preference for a 
“dominating” style (i.e., similar to an individualistic orientation) in fact increased group 
outcome.  
 How can these inconsistent findings be explained? There are several aspects that 
may impede or reverse the positive effect of a cooperative orientation relative to an 
individualistic orientation. First, sometimes groups with only cooperative members may 
focus heavily on cooperation and satisfice – i.e., choosing the first acceptable solution 
rather than searching for an optimal agreement (Simon, 1957). Identifying optimal 
agreements in group negotiations typically requires hard work (Kramer, 1991). 
Furthermore, one-sided focus on cooperation may result in members giving up their 
individual interests, believing that this will help the group. To develop high quality 
decisions, however, negotiators have to hold on to individual interests, and not yield 
uncritically (Pruitt, 1983). Importantly, when group members have information about 
each others’ cooperative orientation, tendencies towards satisficing may be even higher 
than when no such information is present. Cooperative members knowing that their 
teammates share their cooperative orientation may easily satisfice – believing that the 
shared cooperative orientations themselves will secure a high quality agreement. Indeed, 
yielding behavior is found to be detrimental for cooperators. For example, the meta-
analytical review by De Dreu et al. (2000) showed – consistent with the predictions from 
Dual Concern Theory – that cooperative negotiators only reached mutually-beneficial 
outcomes when they had high resistance to yielding. Cooperative dyads with low 
resistance to yielding were found to be less problem-solving, more contentious and 
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reached lower joint outcomes than cooperative dyads with high (or no specified) 
resistance to yielding.  
Second, while the cooperative groups may be hampered by phenomena such as 
satisficing, the individualistic groups may improve their performance through 
enlightened self-interest (Rubin, 1991). Typically, individualistic groups are expected to 
have distributive processes where members actively use arguments to persuade the 
others to make concessions. However, knowing that the other members share an 
individualistic orientation may tell the negotiator that the possibility to exploit the other 
parties is limited. If all the members recognize that pressure-tactics will be of no use 
because co-members are unwilling to make concessions, their only way to get a high 
individual outcome will be to engage in integrative behavior in order to enlarge the total 
pie. The parties want to maximize their individual outcome (self-interest), but realize 
that the best way to do this is by also paying attention to the others interests 
(enlightened). An escalative integrative process, coupled with the participant’s energetic 
search for a high individual outcome, may create a dynamic that drive the individualistic 
groups towards optimal solutions. This reasoning is consistent with Harinck and De Dreu 
(2004) who found temporary impasses to help negotiators to get an integrative process 
late in the negotiation. Thus, negotiators that experience trouble in the first part of a 
negotiation may come to a point where they realize that changing behavior is needed to 
accomplish their goals. Individualistic groups knowing that their team-mates share an 
individualistic orientation may try to use distributive behavior early in the negotiation in 
order to test the other’s willingness to concede, but then progressively shift to a more 
integrative process when they recognize that their pressure tactics don’t work.  
 Finally, in groups with mix in orientation we believe that integrative processes 
will be difficult to achieve when members are aware of the difference in members’ 
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motivational orientation. The individualistic members are likely to try to take advantage 
of those members they know are cooperatively oriented, and accordingly; cooperative 
members will have to safeguard against such exploitation. These groups are therefore 
likely to get low joint outcomes and be dissatisfied, because they lack the integrative 
process usually associated with high-quality agreements. Supporting this reasoning, 
Schei and Rognes (2003) found that in mixed dyads (i.e., cooperator versus individualist) 
where the individualist knew that the opponent was cooperatively motivated, integrative 
activities, perceived negotiation quality, and joint outcome were low. In sum then, based 
on the reasoning above, we suggest the following alternative hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4: Joint outcome will be maximized when all group members are 
individualistic. 
Hypothesis 5: Satisfaction will be maximized when all group members are 
cooperative. 
Hypothesis 6: The negotiation process will be more integrative and less 
distributive towards the end of the negotiation when all group members are 
individualistic. 
Method and Validation 
Design and Procedure 
We used 228 undergraduate business students (35% female) enrolled in an 
organizational behavior course as participants in the study. Average age was 21. 
Participants were randomly assigned a cooperative or an individualistic orientation, and 
grouped into three-person groups. This gave four different compositions: (1) cooperative 
groups (n = 20) having three cooperators (CCC), (2) cooperative majority (n = 19) 
having two cooperators and one individualist (CCI), (3) individualistic majority (n = 19) 
having one cooperator and two individualists (CII), and (4) individualistic groups (n = 
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18) containing three individualists (III).  
The experiment was conducted during a class meeting in the course. Each 
negotiator received confidential role instructions, manipulation instructions, and a profit 
schedule that showed their individual earnings associated with the different possible 
alternatives. The participants had 15 minutes of preparation, and the groups were 
allowed to negotiate for 45 minutes. Finally, participants answered the post-negotiation 
questionnaire containing background information, manipulation checks, and process 
measures, and were debriefed. 
Negotiation Task 
We used a negotiation task similar to the one used by Schei and Rognes (2005). 
Three people negotiated how they would form a business partnership. More specifically, 
participants negotiated the construction of a joint office complex – representing an 
airline, insurance, or a consulting company. The payoff matrix is shown in table 1. Five 
issues had to be negotiated; 1) move-in date, 2) geographical location of the building, 3) 
architectural design, 4) distribution of maintenance costs, and 5) establishment of joint 
service functions. The group had to resolve all five issues to reach an agreement. The 
negotiation simulation was symmetric, giving all the members the same maximum 
achievable points and equal chances of reaching this sum. The task had both integrative 
and distributive issues. The three integrative issues (issue 2, 3, and 5) allowed for joint 
gain through logrolling (cf. Mannix, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). The two 
distributive issues (issue 1 and 4) made the symmetry in the payoff matrix less obvious 
and raised the potential conflict level in the groups.  
Manipulation 
We followed previous research on motivational orientation in negotiation and 
manipulated the two orientations through written instructions. The manipulations were 
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presented as instructions to negotiators from management (cf. Weingart et al., 1993). In 
the individualistic condition, the subjects read that their primary goal was to maximize 
own outcome. In the cooperative condition, the participants read that their primary goal 
was to maximize own and group outcome. The manipulation was followed by 
information from management regarding which orientation the negotiator could expect 
from each of the other group members, based on previous negotiations the company had 
had with the other group members.  
We examined the effects of the manipulation instructions by asking the subjects 
in the post-negotiation questionnaire to indicate their primary objective in the 
negotiation: (a) maximize own outcome, (b) maximize own and group outcome, or (c) 
other (cf. Weingart et al., 1993). The instructions had a significant impact on the subjects 
orientation, χ2 (2, N=228) = 151.79, p < .001. In the cooperative condition, 92% of the 
subjects answered maximize own and group outcome, and in the individualistic 
condition 86% of the subjects answered maximize own outcome. Consistent with earlier 
studies of mix in motivational orientation (e.g., Schei & Rognes, 2003; 2005), we 
included in our primary analyses only those groups where all group members answered 
the manipulation check correctly. This procedure ensured that the hypotheses-tests were 
done only on groups where members understood and adopted their assigned motivational 
orientation (n = 16, 17, 15, 12 in the CCC-, CCI-, CII-, and III-groups, respectively). 
Importantly, exploratory analyses including all groups provided similar results as in the 
primary analyses, and did not change any conclusions.  
Measures 
Joint outcome. We measured joint outcome through (a) joint sum and (b) Pareto 
efficiency. We chose to include both these measures as they are conceptually different, 
and as prior research on group negotiation has shown results to differ slightly on these 
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variables (Weingart et al., 1993). Joint sum was measured as the sum of the profit 
achieved by the three negotiators in a group. Thus, if the negotiators agreed on 
alternative A on all the five issues (AAAAA), joint sum would be 712.5. The range of 
joint sum is from 675 (minimum) to 825 (maximum). Pareto efficiency relates the 
agreements to Pareto optimal settlements. We developed an index based on Tripp and 
Sondak (1992), where we measured the number of possible agreements that were Pareto 
superior to the solution chosen by each group. Pareto efficiency was positively skewed 
(1.78), and we did a log transformation to normalize the distribution (skewness after 
transformation = 0.12). We standardized the variable, and reversed it so that high values 
indicated high Pareto efficiency.  
Satisfaction. We measured satisfaction as the average of three items in the post-
negotiation questionnaire: “How satisfied are you with the negotiation outcome?” ”How 
satisfied are you with the negotiation process?” and “To which degree is the group 
agreement acceptable to you?” To use satisfaction at the group level, we calculated the 
inter-rater agreement index for multiple items (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; 1993). 
Average inter-rater agreement was .83, and did not differ significantly across 
compositions. This is well above the suggested benchmark of .70. (George & 
Bettenhausen, 1990), and justifies the use of satisfaction as a group variable (George & 
James, 1993). Finally, inspecting for outliers on the satisfaction scale, the score on one 
item in one group was removed due to a standardized value above |3|. The reliability 
coefficient of the satisfaction scale was α = .74. 
Negotiation Process. We measured the negotiation process with several 
questions in the post-negotiation questionnaire. The items are shown in Table 2. The 
participants were asked to indicate the extent of integrative and distributive activities, 
respectively. Consistent with the procedure in Schei and Rognes (2003), the group 
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members discussed each of the statement in Table 2 before giving their individual 
answers. Group members typically gave the same answers, but in the very few cases of 
disagreement, we used the average score of the group members to compose the measure. 
The participants first answered questions regarding the overall process, and then for each 
of three phases. Three phases is often suggested in phase-approaches to negotiations, i.e. 
initiation, problem-solving, and resolution (Holmes, 1992). The participants were told 
that phase 1 should be seen as about the first 25 percent of the time used, phase 2 as 
about the next 50 percent, and phase 3 as about the last 25 percent of the time used. A 
principal component analysis of the total process revealed as expected an integrative 
factor and a distributive factor (see Table 2). Inspecting for outliers showed that in three 
cases integrative items had standardized scores above |3| and the score on these items in 
the respective groups were therefore removed. The reliability coefficients were α = .66 
for the integrative activities and α = .61 for the distributive activities, which we find 
acceptable given the broad nature of these variables.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for the group-level variables. 
Group composition as measured by number of individualistic members is positively 
correlated with joint outcome and Pareto efficiency, and negatively correlated with 
satisfaction. The overall degrees of integrative and distributive activities are only 
moderately correlated with group composition (number of individualistic members) and 
group outcome variables (joint sum, Pareto efficiency, and satisfaction).  
Group Outcome 
We first examined the effects of group composition on joint outcome (joint sum 
and Pareto efficiency). Table 4 show means, standard deviations, and results from an 
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Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and pair-wise comparisons. As can be seen in Table 4, 
group composition had a significant impact on both indicators of joint outcome: Joint 
sum; F (3, 56) = 7.51, p < .001, η2 = .29, and Pareto efficiency; F (3, 56) = 5.70, p < .01, 
η2 = .23. Individualistic groups reached higher joint sum and higher Pareto efficiency (M 
= 802 and 0.92, respectively) than cooperative groups (M = 750 and -0.21), cooperative 
majority groups (M = 740 and -0.43), and individualistic majority groups (M = 749 and -
0.08). Pair-wise comparisons showed that joint sum and Pareto efficiency were 
significantly better in the individualistic groups than in any of the other three 
compositions (p < .01), whereas no significant differences emerged among these other 
compositions. These results counter Hypothesis 1 that number of cooperative members 
in the group is positive for joint outcome. The results do, however, support the 
alternative Hypothesis 4 that joint outcome will be higher when all group members are 
individualistic. 
Second, we examined the effects of group composition on satisfaction. As shown 
in Table 4, group composition had a significant impact on satisfaction, F (3, 56) = 4.98, 
p < .01, η2 = .21. Members of cooperative groups were more satisfied (M = 3.74) than 
members of individualistic groups (M = 3.36), individualistic majority groups (M = 
3.44) and cooperative majority groups (M = 3.36). Pair-wise comparisons showed that 
satisfaction in cooperative groups was significantly better then in each of the other group 
compositions (p < .01). No other comparisons differed significantly. The results do not 
fully support Hypotheses 2 that group members’ satisfaction will be higher the more 
cooperative members there are in the group, but do entirely support the alternative 
Hypothesis 4 that cooperative satisfaction will be higher when all group members are 
cooperative.  
Negotiation Process 
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We first examined how group composition affected integrative activities (i.e., 
information exchange, trust). We did a 4 (compositions) X 3 (phases) analysis of 
variance with phases as repeated measures. The cell means for integrative activities are 
shown in the left half of Table 5. Group composition (between-subjects) did not affect 
the overall integrative activities, F (3, 56) = 0.22, ns. Phase (within-subjects) had a 
significant linear impact on integrative activities, F (1, 56) = 10.33, p < .01, η2 = .16. As 
can be seen in Table 5, integrative activities increased over time. The interaction 
between composition and phase was also significant, F (3, 56) = 6.68, p < .001, η2 = .26. 
Inspection of the means show that the individualistic groups had a strong increase in 
integrative activities during the negotiation, being the group composition with the least 
integrative activity in phase 1 and the most integrative activity in phase 3. Simple effects 
analyses showed that the individualistic groups were the only ones that increased their 
integrative activities significantly throughout the three negotiation phases, F (1, 11) = 
16.24, p < .01, η2 = 0.60, being more integrative in phase 2 than in phase 1 (p < .01), and 
being more integrative in phase 3 than in phase 2 (p = .05). Comparing integrative 
activities across group compositions in each of the three phases separately showed a 
marginal significant difference in phase 3, F (3, 56) = 2.47, p = .07, where the 
individualistic groups had significantly more integrative activities than both the mixed 
orientation groups (p < .05), but not significantly more than the cooperative groups (p = 
.24).  
Next, we examined how group composition affected distributive activities (i.e., 
conflict, argumentation). Again, we did a 4 (compositions) X 3 (phases) analysis of 
variance with phases as repeated measures. The cell means for distributive activities are 
shown in the right half of Table 5. Group composition (between-subjects) did not impact 
the overall distributive activities, F (3, 56) = 0.37, ns. Phase (within-subjects) did not 
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have a linear impact on integrative activities, F (l, 56) = 0.14, ns, but had a strong 
quadratic effect, F (l, 56) = 21.35, p < .001, η2 = .28. The means in Table 5 show a 
reversed U-shaped pattern where distributive activities increase from phase 1 to phase 2, 
and then decrease in phase 3. The interaction between composition and phase was 
significant, F (3, 56) = 4.65, p < .01, η2 = .15. Individualistic groups were the only ones 
with a drop in distributive activities from the first to the final phase. While starting out as 
the most distributive of the group compositions, the individualistic groups finished as the 
group having the lowest amount of distributive activities. Simple effects analyses 
showed that the individualistic and the mixed groups had a quadratic effect (F > 5, p < 
.05). Individualistic groups and individualistic majority groups had a significant decrease 
in distributive activities from phase 2 to phase 3 (p < .05), while the two mixed groups 
also had a significant increase in distributive activities from phase 1 to phase 2. 
Comparing across composition in each of the phases revealed no significant results – 
phase 3 being nearest (F (3, 56) = 1.82, p = .16), where individualistic groups were 
lower in distributive activities than the mixed groups (p < .05). 
The results for integrative and distributive activities do not support Hypothesis 3 
that stated that the negotiation process would be more integrative and less distributive 
the more cooperative members there were in the group. Rather, the pattern of results 
supports our Hypothesis 6 that the negotiation process would be more integrative and 
less distributive towards the end of the negotiation, when all group members were 
individualistic.  
Additional Analyses 
In addition to test the hypotheses, we also examined the relationship between the 
negotiation process and joint sum. Regression analyses for negotiation process 
(integrative and distributive activities) on joint sum are shown in Table 6. We ran three 
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separate regressions, one for each of the three phases. The negotiation process in the two 
first phases did not affect joint sum (phase 1; R2 = .02, ns, phase 2; R2 = .03, ns). 
However, the negotiation process in phase 3 had a significant impact on outcome (R2 = 
.27, p < .001). Integrative activities in the final phase had a significant positive effect on 
joint sum (β = .36, p < .01), while distributive activities had a significant negative effect 
(β = -.35, p < .01). 
Finally, we did hierarchical analyses to test for mediation following the 
recommendations outlined by Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998). Group composition and 
negotiation process where regressed on joint sum – entering composition in Step 1, and 
phase 3- integrative and distributive activities in Step 2.  The results are shown in Table 
7. Entering the process variables (integrative and distributive) into the model increased 
ΔR2 significantly from .15 to .37, F (2, 56) = 9.62, p < .001. Integrative activities had a 
positive (β = .34, p < .01), and distributive activities had a negative (β = -.31, p < .01) 
effect on joint sum. However, because the significant effect of group composition in Step 
1 (β = .38, p < .01) did not disappear when the process variables were entered in Step 2 
(β = .31, p < .01), no evidence for full mediation was obtained. Composition and process 
variables co-determine joint sum. 
Discussion 
 The use of cross-functional teams and heterogeneous project groups are pervasive 
both inside and between organizations. When members of such on-going groups 
negotiate their decisions they are often aware of how their team-mates are likely to 
approach the task (e.g., having individualistic or cooperative goals). The present study 
contributes to the negotiation literature by being the first to examine how the mixture of 
motivational orientations in a group impacts negotiation- process and outcome when 
members are aware of each other’s orientations. We found groups consisting of only 
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cooperative members (i.e., members trying to maximize group outcome as well as their 
own individual outcome) to be more satisfied with the negotiation than members of the 
other group compositions. In contrast, we found that groups consisting of only 
individualistic members (i.e., members trying to maximize their own individual outcome 
only) achieved higher joint outcome than all the other group compositions (i.e., 
cooperative groups and groups with mix in orientations). Interestingly, the negotiation 
process in the individualistic groups changed from being primarily distributive in the 
beginning to be primarily integrative towards the end of the negotiation. We discuss 
these results and their implications next. 
Implications 
First, the cooperative groups reached low joint outcome, but were highly 
satisfied with the negotiation. The low joint outcome may seem strange; after all, 
members of these groups were motivated to maximize group outcome, and, in addition, 
knew that they shared this goal with the other group-members. We could expect then that 
these members easily would reach optimal agreements by exchanging information in a 
trusting climate. However, this is not what happened. Rather, the cooperative groups 
seemed to engage in satisficing – choosing the first acceptable agreement sooner than 
looking for optimal agreements. The process analyses indicate that the cooperative 
groups never became very integrative or very distributive, and cooperative groups might 
have lacked the energy that is needed to develop integrative agreements (i.e., high joint 
outcome).  
Further research is needed to explain more precisely what went on in the 
cooperative groups, especially because our study failed to find a mediating effect of the 
negotiation process. Importantly, although the low joint outcome in the cooperative 
groups may seem to contradict the vast negotiation research on motivational orientation, 
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it is important to recall that a prerequisite for reaching integrative agreements is 
resistance to yielding (De Dreu et al., 2000). Members of the cooperative groups in the 
present study may have yielded uncritically just because they knew the other members 
where cooperatively oriented. Another explanation may be derived from the motivated 
information-processing perspective (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). According to this 
perspective, joint outcome in cooperative groups will decrease when members have low 
rather than high epistemic motivation – i.e., when they have a low desire to develop and 
hold accurate and well-informed conclusions about the world. Being informed about the 
motivational orientation of the opponents may lower epistemic motivation because the 
desire to search for information about the opponent is reduced. Future research might 
more closely examine the relationship between information about the opponent, 
epistemic motivation, and resistance to yielding. 
Second, individualistic groups reached very high joint outcome, but were not 
very satisfied with the negotiation. The individualistic groups experienced escalation in 
the integrative process, and de-escalation in the distributive process towards the end of 
the negotiation. This pattern is consistent with the idea that members of individualistic 
groups developed an enlightened self-interest: Initially they have a fairly distributive 
stage where firm positions and intentions are established. This is followed by a mid-
stage where they still argue and hold on to their positions, but also share information and 
package issues. In the final stage, distributive activities drop dramatically. Here the 
integrative activities dominate. Thus, the process develops from being mainly 
distributive, to being characterized by a mix of distribution and integration, and to being 
integrative in the resolution stage. The individualists seem to be firm, expecting rightly 
the others to be the same. Based on initial confirmation of expectations they will also 
play integratively. Knowing they cannot beat their opponent, they play with them 
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instead. Consistent with this, the process in the individualistic groups may be explained 
by the “Perceived Feasibility Perspective” that extends the Dual Concern theory. This 
perspective predicts that contending (i.e. distributive behavior) will be an individualists’ 
preferred strategy, “but problem solving is a close second if the contentious approach 
appears infeasible or costly. Indeed, problem solving often seems the most viable way of 
pursuing one’s own interests” (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986: 35). We believe that knowing that 
the other group members’ share one’s individualistic orientation may make pressure-
tactics look less effective, but further research is required to determine more closely 
what kind of processes turned the individualistic groups to be integrative. One 
explanation might be, for instance, that individualistic groups more often reach 
temporary impasses, which turn initially distributive processes into integrative processes 
(Harinck & De Dreu, 2004). Finally, future studies could also examine how 
individualistic groups can enhance subjective outcome-measures such as satisfaction to 
better match the very good objective outcome these groups achieved.  
Third, the mixed orientation groups neither reached high joint outcome, nor were 
they very satisfied with the negotiation. Mixed groups seem to be unable to develop 
growing integrative processes, and rather escalate distributive activities leading to 
inferior joint outcome and low satisfaction. These findings are consistent with Weingart 
et al., (2002) who found their mixed groups to be rather distributive compared to their 
cooperative groups. Mixed groups may simply have problems finding a direction. 
Cooperators may initially try to increase integrative activities in the group, while 
individualists try to reach their goal by constantly demanding concession from their co-
members – who they know is cooperators and therefore likely to concede in the end.  
The findings in this study underscore the importance of understanding 
individualistic compositions. Importantly, individualistic compositions might be more 
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context-sensitive than other compositions. For example, while cooperative groups are 
found to get relatively high joint outcomes under both simultaneous and sequential issue 
considerations, individualistic groups do well when negotiating issues simultaneously – 
but not when negotiating issues sequentially (Weingart et al., 1993). Similarly, while 
cooperative groups are found to negotiate well both when the task structure is 
symmetrical and asymmetrical, individualistic groups do well only when the task 
structure is symmetrical (Beersma & De Dreu, 2002). Correspondingly, in negotiating 
dyads, situational factors such as time pressure (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986) and visual 
access (Lewis & Fry, 1977) are found to affect joint outcome in individualistic dyads but 
not in cooperative dyads. Taken together, these studies indicate that cooperative 
compositions are relatively robust across situations. Hence, cooperative compositions 
may be safe, as they usually reach respectable joint outcomes across situational 
differences. Individualistic compositions seem more risky, though, as the quality of their 
agreements is more dependent on the situational characteristics. This reasoning is 
consistent with Cooperation Theory (Deutsch, 1960), which suggest that, relative to 
cooperators, individualists are more sensitive to situational factors when acting towards 
others. While cooperators are likely to cooperate under various conditions, the behavior 
of the individualist is more unpredictable. However, as shown in this study, 
individualistic compositions may under some conditions (here: group context and 
information about others’ orientation) reach especially high joint outcomes. Future 
research should examine under which conditions the potential of individualistic 
compositions are released. 
Finally, our findings also have some potential practical implications. The present 
study suggests that when joint outcome is important, groups negotiating should be 
composed of individualistic members who know each other’s orientations. This implies 
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that people designing negotiation situations (e.g., managers) may encourage the parties 
to have individualistic orientations and that these orientations are known. For example, 
management may give clear instructions (as in this study) or use incentives that create 
individualistic orientations (e.g., individual-based rewards). In addition, these 
instructions or incentives should be communicated to all participants. Although it may 
feel absurd to create individualistic conditions in order to enhance high joint outcomes, it 
is important to remember that the main objective is to hinder the parties from making 
inferior compromises. Individualistic orientations may stimulate group members to 
participate in energetic search for integrative agreements. We thus advise managers to 
seek for “energetic cooperation” – combining the energy stemming from individualistic 
orientation with the cooperative behavior stemming from recognition of how individual 
goals best can be accomplished. The main point seem to be that negotiators should back 
up individualistic motives with an understanding of the need for cooperation, or back up 
cooperative motives with an understanding of the need for energy (i.e., low resistance to 
yielding). The flipside of this is, however, that members of individualistic groups (and 
mixed groups) were more dissatisfied with the negotiation than were members of the 
cooperative groups. Thus, considering the importance subjective outcomes such as 
satisfaction may have on further meetings in a group, stimulating members to be 
cooperatively oriented may be as important as stimulating them to be individualistic. 
Based on the present results, managers will have to be aware of which outcome-criteria 
that matters the most, and design the negotiations situation (if possible) accordingly. 
Limitations 
 This study has at least three areas for potential improvement. First, there is a need 
to examine the negotiation process more thoroughly. We used a post-negotiation 
questionnaire where group members discussed the process questions before they gave 
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their individual answers. One strength of this procedure is that it most likely improves 
the participants’ reflections on each of the questions. Another possible strength is that we 
also investigated the negotiation process in several phases, which showed that the 
behavior changed significantly throughout the negotiation. Still, the question of why 
groups changed their behavior during the negotiation remains an issue for future 
research. For example, although the steady increase in integrative activities in the 
individualistic groups is consistent with enlightened self-interest, the lack of mediating 
effects make further research needed to support this supposition. 
 Second, the present study examined the effects of motivational orientation when 
members were aware of the other members’ orientation – a likely situation inside 
organizations and between organizations that negotiate frequently with each others. The 
present design cannot, however, tell us the direct effect of having such information about 
the opponent versus not having such information, and testing this question was outside 
the scope of our study. Interestingly, however, the negotiation task used in the current 
study is identical to the task used by Schei and Rognes (2005). They examined the 
effects of motivational orientation when members had no information, but didn’t find 
any differences in joint outcome between group compositions. Nevertheless, comparing 
the joint-outcome scores of the compositions in their study with the joint-outcome scores 
in our study, show that their scores are similar to the scores of our cooperative and mixed 
oriented groups. Consequently, the composition that outperforms all other compositions 
in both studies is the individualistic groups where members are informed. It would be 
interesting to see if studies designed to test the effect of information directly could 
confirm the superiority of informed individualistic groups. 
 Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that some participants changed their 
motivational orientation during the negotiations. However, we believe this to be less 
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likely for two reasons. First, motivational orientation is different from, and more stable 
than, behavior (cf. Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). While negotiators are expected to vary 
how they behave to fulfill their goals, the goals themselves (e.g., the goal of maximizing 
individual outcome) are likely to stay relatively firm. This is why we believe that 
members of individualistic groups became more integrative throughout the negotiation – 
they kept their individual goals but changed their behavior from primarily distributive to 
primarily integrative when the latter behavior seemed to be the best way to accomplish 
their goal. Second, in the manipulation-check, our study-participants characterized their 
goal after the negotiation – indicating what had been their main goal in the negotiation 
(i.e., individualistic, cooperative, or other). If the participants did not adopt their given 
goals or changed their goals during the negotiation, this should show up in the 
manipulation check. Future studies should, nevertheless, make more refined 
examinations to better understand the relationship between negotiators’ goals and 
behavior. 
Conclusion 
The results in this study convey a paradox: Cooperative groups – consisting of 
members who all try to maximize own and group outcome – were much poorer to reach 
high joint outcome than were groups where every member only cared for their own 
individual outcome (i.e., individualistic groups). The irony is that having a goal of 
reaching a good joint outcome was, in fact, harmful to the achievement of such a goal. 
Groups rather got to high joint outcomes when members had individualistic goals. Thus, 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” – the metaphor explaining why individuals pursuing 
their own good tends also to promote the good of the community – seem to appear in yet 
another arena. The common understanding of individualistic orientations as essentially 
detrimental in negotiations may therefore be reconsidered.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Payoff Matrix 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Issues  Alternatives                   Role 1          Role 2         Role 3           Sum 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Issue 1  A   25  0  50  75 
  B   25  25  25  75 
  C   0  50  25  75 
  D   50  25  0  75 
 
Issue 2  A   150  12.5  25            187.5 
  B   200  0  0  200 
  C   100  25  50  175 
  D   0  50  100  150 
  E   50  37.5  75            162.5 
 
Issue 3  A   50  100  0  150 
  B   0  0  200  200 
  C   37.5  75  50            162.5 
  D   12.5  25  150            187.5 
  E   25  50  100  175 
 
Issue 4  A   0  100  50  150 
  B   50  0  100  150 
  C   50  50  50  150 
  D   100  50  0  150 
 
Issue 5  A   100  0  50  150 
  B   75  50  37.5            162.5 
  C   50  100  25  175 
  D   25  150  12.5            187.5 
  E   0  200  0  200 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Minimum payoff   0  0  0  675 
Maximum payoff   500  500  500  825 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Negotiators saw only their own payoff, and were not allowed to exchange 
preference charts. 
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Table 2 
Factor Analysis for Negotiation Process 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Process Items            Integrative         Distributive 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. Not sure that the truth was told (reverse coded)   .79  -.09 
2. Trusted the information exchange     .77  -.04 
3. Communicated our interests clearly    .68   .33 
4. Exchanged information about interests/priorities   .52  -.02 
5. Pressed to get individual interests through   .09   .82 
6. Conflict among members     -.35   .82 
7. Argumentation       .11   .49 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Principal component analysis with oblique rotation. Integrative factor: Eigenvalue 
= 2.11 and percent of variance explained = 30.2; distributive factor: 1.69 and 24.1, 
respectively.
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Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study Variables 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable      Mean             SD      1             2                3              4                5             
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Group composition (# of individualists)  2.42           1.09     1        
2. Joint outcome     758           42   .38**             1  
3. Pareto efficiency     0.00           1.00   .38**           .94***        1        
4. Satisfaction      3.49           0.33   -.37**           .06         .04              1  
5. Integrative activities (total)   4.11           0.57   -.09           .18      .04            .14         1        
6. Distributive activities (total)   3.50           0.61   .10           -.06      .03            -.09        .08 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: n = 60 groups. 
** p < .01, p < .001*** 
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Table 4 
ANOVA Results for Group Outcome across Group Compositions 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                    Group Composition 
              ___________________________________________ 
Group Outcome         CCC    CCI      CII        III    F (3, 56)        Eta-square 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Joint sum          Mean   750a     740a     749a     802b     7.51***    .29         
                SD     44      44      23      33  
Pareto efficiency         Mean   -0.21a    -0.43a   -0.08a   0.92b     5.70**      .23 
                SD   1.05    1.02    0.76    0.67     
Satisfaction              Mean   3.74b    3.36a    3.44a    3.36a     4.98**    .21 
              SD   0.29    0.37    0.25    0.34 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < .01. CCC = Cooperative groups, CCI = Cooperative majority groups, 
CII = Individualistic majority groups, and III = Individualistic groups. 
** p < .01, p < .001***
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Table 5 
Means for Integrative and Distributive Activities in Three Phases across Group Compositions 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
           Integrative Activities       Distributive Activities 
                        __________________________________         ___________________________________ 
Group Compositions    Phase 1      Phase 2 Phase 3      Total  Phase 1      Phase 2 Phase 3      Total 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Cooperative groups (CCC)   3.99       4.19 4.26       4.15  3.27       3.46 3.33       3.35 
Cooperative majority groups (CCI)  4.10       4.03 4.01       4.05  3.10       3.70 3.56       3.45 
Individualistic majority groups (CII)  3.99       4.02 3.98       4.00  3.22       3.93 3.53       3.56 
Individualistic groups (III)   3.55       4.20 4.52       4.09  3.58       3.75 2.92       3.42 
Total      3.91       4.11 4.19       4.07  3.29       3.71 3.34       3.45 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Totals refer to the means across compositions and phases, respectively.
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Table 6 
Regression Analyses of Negotiation Process on Joint Sum 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Negotiation Process    Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Integrative activities    -.09    .17   .36** 
Distributive activities     .12    .07  -.35** 
R2       .02    .03    .27  
F for R2               0.70  0.99           10.72*** 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Regression analyses were run as three separate models, one for each phase. 
Standardized coefficients are shown. 
** p < .01, p < .001*** 
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Table 7 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses on Joint Sum 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Variable        Step 1     Step 2 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Group composition       .38**      .31** 
Integrative activities in phase 3         .34** 
Distributive activities in phase 3        -.31** 
R2         .15      .37  
F for R2      9.88**             10.69*** 
 ΔR2             .22  
F for ΔR2                    9.62*** 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Standardized coefficients are shown. 
** p < .01, p < .001*** 
 
